



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-0001

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
SUBJECT: NAPA Workplan for the Study of Intelligence
Personnel Systems

Enclosed is the Defense Intelligence Agency's response
on Task VII-Personnel Security.



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1 Enclosure a/s



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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION REQUEST

PERSONNEL SECURITY

1. Personnel Security Procedures and Timeframes:

a. Copies of appropriate portions of personnel or procedures manuals pertaining to security clearances (initial and reinvestigation):

Attached are DCID 1/14 (enclosure 1) and DoD 5200.2-R (enclosure 2) which are the primary national and DoD directives on personnel security. The DIA regulation on personnel security, DIAR 50-8, is presently undergoing a major revision and is not in a form suitable for outside review.

b. Breakdown of time it takes to complete the process, broken down by major components of the process, if possible:

(1) The Defense Investigative Service provides investigative support for DIA. DIA's investigative requirements generally require ~~SBIs and PRs~~ ^{3 months} which generally require an approximate median time of 84 and 81 calendar days completion time respectively. DIS should be requested to furnish more exact data on investigative completion times if further information in this area is required.

(2) DIA attempts to bring most individuals on board at the Secret level provided they can be temporarily utilized at that security level pending a final higher level clearance action. Security processing times are a function of the security background of the individual concerned, that is, the individual's prior investigative and security clearance history, and the security clearance initially required for work purposes at the DIA entrance on duty (EOD) date. To determine overall security processing times, OS-3 periodically conducts statistical random sample surveys to determine overall security processing times as measured in the number of calendar days between the date of the DIA Personnel Directorate (RHR) nomination letter to the Office of Security (OS-3) and the date of the responding OS-3 security determination memorandum to RHR. Because of the variability of the response time, due to the aforementioned factors, OS-3 prefers to use the median number of calendar days for measuring the security acceptance turnaround times, as a representative time. Two recent random sample surveys reflect 54 and 59 days, median turnaround times during FYs 85, 86 and 87. The bulk of this security processing time is consumed by file acquisition time, where prior investigations exist, and investigative time where prior investigative files do not exist. DIA case control and adjudicative times are relatively minor portions of the security acceptance time equation. OS-3's average time, in workdays, to adjudicate cases in FY's 85, 86 and 87 were 7, 6 and 8 work days respectively.

2. Impact of security investigation on agency selection process:

a. Statistics on those not hired (1985-87) because they do not meet security requirements:

This type of data is not maintained by DIA.

b. Data on numbers who withdraw their employment application during the security review process (1985-87). Of this number how many cited some aspects of the security process -- i.e. length of time, intrusive nature of investigation -- as the reason for withdrawing.

This type of data is not maintained by DIA.

3. Extent of impact of security process on lifestyle/family issues:

Number of staff who cite as their reason for leaving some aspect of the security requirements -- i.e. reinvestigation, family travel limitations, etc. (1985-87):

See comment at 2b. above.

4. Impact of involuntary staff separations on agency security:

a. Number of staff removed per year, reasons for removal (broadly categorized) and security clearance level of those removed for 1985-87:

This data is not maintained by DIA. Statistical data maintained for an annual DoD report indicates the following SCI denial/revocation data for DIA, OSD, OJCS and the Defense Agencies (less NSA):

<u>FY</u>	<u>DENIALS</u>	<u>REVOCATIONS</u>
FY85	Data is not available	
FY86	104	14
FY87	78	4

The data cannot be broken down by component activity.

b. Agency policies on assessing the level/type of classified information removed staff have, and whether there is a risk that removed staff will act against the national security interest:

Attached is a copy of this agency's regulation DIAR 54-4 (enclosure 3). An internal SOP is used to supplement this regulation.

c. Examples of alternatives other than removal -- for those employees deemed a security risk if separated -- and extent to which agencies use these alternatives:

The specifics of each individual case will determine the manner and timing of any action under DIAR 54-4. Opportunities for extended employment at a low level of clearance or no clearance are extremely limited. DIA attempts to make the separation process as painless as is possible to avoid any feelings of recrimination towards the U.S. Government.

5. Views on the polygraph examination as a security tool:

a. Agency suggestions on background literature:

The most appropriate literature to fully describe the DoD Counterintelligence (CI) Scope Security Polygraph efforts would be the DoD Polygraph Program Report to Congress for both fiscal years 1986 and 1987. They contain background information, statistics, and examples of the utility of the polygraph in the counterintelligence and security fields. Copies are available from DUSD(P), Room 3C-267, the Pentagon. POC is [REDACTED]

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b. Agency views on using the polygraph as a screening device, and rationale on when it is used in the clearance process:

DIA began an in-house polygraph capability in July 1987, predominantly to support the CI Scope polygraph needs under the Congressionally approved DoD Polygraph Test Program. DIA strictly adheres to the CI Scope (non-lifestyle) format, and administers the examinations on an aperiodic basis, to on-board employees. Initial (prior to access/employment) examinations will be considered when the program is fully manned, and in an appropriate polygraph suite environment. DIA considers the CI scope polygraph examination to be a very important adjunct to its security program, to supplement the more traditional background investigation and subject interview. Acceptance of this program within DIA has been overwhelmingly favorable.

3 Enclosures a/s